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INDIA: THE BURDEN OF DOMESTIC FOOD POLICY 
 
 
KENSUKE KUBO 
 
 
Introduction 
 
India is the second largest producer of rice in the world after China. Of the approximately 623 
million tons of rough rice, or paddy, produced globally in 2005, 22 percent was cultivated in 
India.1 In recent years, India has also become a major presence in the international rice 
market. During the 1980s, Indian exports of milled rice were less than one million tons per 
year. Since 1994-1995, however, annual rice exports from India have run in the millions of 
tons, occasionally surpassing five million tons, making India one of the world’s largest 
exporters alongside Thailand and Vietnam. Yet, compared with other rice exporters, India has 
been an unstable supplier: the coefficient of variation of India’s net exports of rice during 
2000-2007 was 0.37.2 This is much higher than the corresponding figures for Thailand (0.16), 
Vietnam (0.13), and the USA (0.17). 
During the surge in global rice prices in 2007-2008, the unreliability of India’s exports 
came into full view. On October 9, 2007, the Indian government introduced a series of 
restrictions on rice exports, culminating in an outright ban on the export of rice other than 
basmati varieties in April 2008. As of August 2010, these restrictions remain in force. 
Several authors have pointed out India’s role in precipitating the international price surge. 
For example, Mitchell (2008) shows how the export price of Thai rice began to rise rapidly 
soon after India introduced export restrictions. He observes that “there were no other 
important market developments at that time [besides the export restrictions by India and other 
countries] that could account for the subsequent rice price increases” (p.13). A report by the 
United States Department of Agriculture also concludes that export restrictions by India and 
Vietnam were among the immediate causes of the price rise (Childs and Kiawu 2009). Wright 
(2009) calls the imposition of export restrictions by the Indian government a “key decision in 
generating the crisis in prices” (p.9). 
Despite the consensus that India’s export restrictions played a crucial role during the crisis, 
detailed economic analyses on the reasons behind those restrictions remain scant. According 
to Childs and Kiawu (2009), the aim of the Indian government was to suppress domestic food 
prices and win political points ahead of major elections. While there is no doubt that price 
                                                  
1 Calculations based on United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Foreign Agricultural Service, 
Production, Supply and Distribution Online (http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/). 
2 The coefficient of variation is a standardized statistic that represents the degree of variability of a quantity, 
taking on a value between zero and one. A higher value for the coefficient of variation implies higher 
variability. 
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stabilization was a major goal, it was evidently not the only one. If the Indian government was 
only interested in price stabilization, it would have intervened in the rice market by releasing 
part of its stocks. In fact, its market operations went in the exact opposite direction: during 
2007-2008, a record-breaking 28.5 million tons of rice were procured by the Indian 
government (Department of Food and Public Distribution 2010). Thus, it appears that 
concerns other than price stabilization also influenced policy-makers’ decisions. Clarifying 
the nature of those concerns is an important step towards improving our understanding of the 
2007-2008 crisis. 
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the reasons behind India’s rice-export 
restrictions. The export restrictions were partly driven by the Indian government’s desire to 
meet procurement goals for rice. Those goals, in turn, were defined by physical requirements 
for the public distribution system (PDS), a vast government scheme that provides food and 
other supplies to low-income households at subsidized prices. Although the PDS is often 
criticized for its inefficiency, there is some indication that expanding supply through the 
system contributes to increased food consumption by the lowest income households. Thus, 
uninterrupted grain procurement through the PDS is a major component of the poverty 
reduction effort in India. 
Unfortunately, the government’s need to procure a large amount of grain each year imposes 
a significant cost, beyond the so-called “food subsidy” arising from the negative margin 
between public distribution prices and procurement costs. By fixing a rigid procurement 
target for itself, the Indian government loses the ability to stabilize prices by participating in 
the market as a net seller of grain. Rather than release stocks, the government is compelled to 
purchase large quantities of grain during the harvesting season even when prices are 
extraordinarily high. By becoming a desperate buyer, the government is liable to play a 
price-destabilizing role. 
In hindsight, the government’s procurement operations during and after the harvesting 
season in 2007-2008 appear to have fueled the rise in rice prices. The government had to 
either raise its procurement price or restrict exports as it tried to meet procurement goals amid 
high demand abroad and tight market conditions domestically. It tried both measures, but 
initial attempts were too weak to stem the flow of rice exports, and procurement targets 
remained unmet. Market participants expected stronger measures—higher procurement prices 
and stricter restrictions on exports—to be taken by the Indian government. This led farmers 
and traders to withhold supply, which inevitably led to a further rise in the market price. 
Eventually, the government had to impose an outright ban on the export of non-basmati rice. 
Given that the government’s procurement and distribution activities create such a large 
burden during episodes of rising prices, it is worthwhile considering how the country’s rice 
policy could be adjusted. One possibility is to widen the geographical coverage of 
procurement activities. This may soften competition between the government’s procurement 
demand and the private sector’s demand for exported rice, which appears to have been a 
driving force behind the price rise in 2007-2008. Faced with less competition from exporters, 
the government can more easily achieve its procurement targets without having to restrict 
exports. 
A more drastic measure would be to reduce the government’s physical involvement in the 
rice market. Rather than procuring and distributing massive amounts of grain each year, the 
government could focus its market operations on price stabilization. The food stamps 
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initiative, proposed by Ramaswami (2002), is one method for subsidizing the food 
consumption of low-income households whereby the government need not handle grain. 
While implementing such a policy might entail large adjustment costs, the 2007-2008 crisis 
strengthens the case for a serious reconsideration of food policy along these lines. 
This chapter builds on a basic understanding of the Indian rice economy and the attendant 
government policies to develop the above arguments, and is organized as follows. Section 1 
briefly describes rice production and consumption in India. This is followed by a description 
of Indian rice policy, focusing on the procurement system and the PDS, in Section 2. Section 
3 presents an analysis of Indian rice exports prior to the restrictions in 2007. Section 4 
describes the 2007-2008 export restrictions, as well as its aftermath, in some detail. Section 5 
evaluates the Indian government’s policies and actions in the context of the price surge. This 
is followed by a concluding section. 
 
 
1. Production and Consumption of Rice 
 
A major milestone for the Indian rice economy was the attainment of self-sufficiency in the 
mid-1970s. As Figure 2-1 shows, production has remained volatile thereafter, but India has 
been able to amass sufficient stocks. Since the mid-1990s, several million tons of rice have 
been exported each year. 
 
Factors Contributing to Production Growth 
An important factor that contributed to rice self-sufficiency was the introduction and 
widespread adoption of modern agricultural technology including high-yielding varieties 
(HYVs). Figure 2-2 shows how Indian rice cultivation evolved over time in terms of acreage 
and yield. In the figure, changes in production are decomposed into changes in acreage and 
changes in yield. Until the first half of the 1970s, production growth was mostly led by 
expansion in acreage. In the mid-1970s, however, yield growth became the main source of 
increased production; this tendency was strengthened in the 1980s. Yield growth has 
continued into the 1990s and beyond, but rice acreage appears to have hit a ceiling in recent 
years. 
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Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Foreign Agricultural Service, Production, Supply and 
Distribution Online (http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/). 
Figure 2-1  Production and Consumption of Milled Rice in India 
 
 
Source: Department of Agriculture and Cooperation (2008). 
Note: Five-year moving averages are used for each variable. 
Figure 2-2  Acreage and Yield in India's Rice Production  
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Rice is produced in almost all parts of the country. As Table 2-1 shows, the eight largest 
rice-producing states are geographically dispersed; they can be found in the northern, eastern, 
central, as well as southern regions of India. Of the main rice states, the one with the highest 
productivity is Punjab in northern India. This state also witnessed a remarkable growth in 
acreage during the 1970s and 1980s as irrigated area expanded. Meanwhile, in the eastern 
states of Orissa and Bihar (including Jharkhand) and in the central state of Madhya Pradesh 
(including Chhattisgarh), average yield has remained low.3 
There is some geographical variation in the share of modern HYVs. While HYVs make up 
more than 90 percent of the rice crop in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, their shares in West 
Bengal and Orissa are only around 70 percent. This reflects the fact that in some parts of 
eastern India, where seasonal floods and crop submergence are common, traditional 
flood-tolerant varieties continue to be grown (Kshirsagar and Pandey 1997). In northern India 
also, the share of HYV is slightly lower than in the southern states. This is attributable to the 
cultivation of basmati varieties, which are not classified as HYVs, in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, 
and neighboring Haryana. Basmati varieties are high-value cultivars characterized by their 
fragrance, grain shape and size, and cooking properties (Singh 2000). In 1998-1999, 1.25 
million tons of basmati rice were cultivated on 683 thousand hectares of land, around 70 
percent of which was exported.4 
 
Changes in Per Capita Consumption 
As the population of India continues to grow at an average annual rate of around 1.5 percent, 
the sustainability of food self-sufficiency in the country has become a serious concern. A key 
element of India’s food requirement is per capita consumption. 
Table 2-2 presents estimates for per capita rice consumption based on a large-scale 
household survey conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization in 2004-2005. 
Separate estimates are made for each quintile. The table reveals that in rural India, people in 
the lowest income group (the first quintile) have the lowest per capita consumption of rice. In 
urban areas as well, the lowest income quintile exhibits lower per capita consumption than all 
the other quintiles except for the highest one. These findings suggest that for lower income 
Indians, rice is a normal good whose consumption increases with income. This implies that as 
the livelihoods of lower income households improve over time, aggregate rice consumption is 
expected to increase. 
                                                  
3 Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand are states formed in 2000 by separating from Madhya Pradesh, 
Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh, respectively. In the undivided Madhya Pradesh, a majority of the rice production 
took place in what later became Chhattisgarh. In the case of undivided Bihar, the present-day Bihar was the 
region where most rice production took place. Similarly in the undivided Uttar Pradesh, rice was mostly 
produced in the present-day Uttar Pradesh. 
4 According to the Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Directorate of Rice Development, the state-wise 
distribution of basmati production in 1998-1999 was as follows. Haryana: 632 thousand tons; Uttar Pradesh: 
354 thousand tons; Punjab: 164 thousand tons; the remaining states combined: 101 thousand tons. 
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Table 2-2  Average Rice Consumption by Income Quintile in 2004-2005 
Income 
quintile 
Rural sector Urban sector 
Per capita total 
consumption 
expenditure 
(rupees per 
month) 
Per capita rice 
consumption 
(kg per month) 
Per capita total 
consumption 
expenditure 
(rupees per 
month) 
Per capita rice 
consumption  
(kg per month) 
1  0～320 6.21 0～480 4.80 
2 320～410 6.39 485～675 5.12 
3 410～510 6.60 675～930 4.93 
4 510～690 6.86 930～1380 4.89 
5 690～ 6.69 1380～ 4.53 
Source: National Sample Survey Organization. Level and Pattern of Consumer Expenditure, 
2004-05. 
Notes: Each income quintile consists of approximately twenty percent of the total population.  
The exchange rate in 2004-4005 was approximately 45 rupees per US dollar. 
 
It should thus come as somewhat of a surprise that the per capita consumption of rice in 
India declined during the 1990s and early 2000s, a period of moderate economic growth 
(Figure 2-3). As a result of this decline, the growth rate of aggregate rice consumption also 
fell during the same period. This is one of the reasons why India’s rice economy has been able 
to maintain self-sufficiency despite slowing growth in production. 
Why did per capita rice consumption decrease during the 1990s and early 2000s? One 
explanatory factor is the stagnation of income among the rural poor during the economic 
reform period that began in 1991 (Himanshu 2007). Another explanation is that during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, there was stagnation in the public distribution of rice by the 
government while market prices rose (Chand 2005). According to Figure 2-3, per capita rice 
consumption increased during the period 2005-2007, and so has the growth rate of aggregate 
consumption. As discussed in the next section, this reflects to some extent an increase in rice 
distribution by the government. 
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2. India’s Food Policy 
 
The Indian government’s food policy, which is mainly focused on rice and wheat, consists of 
two pillars: (i) government procurement of farmers’ output, and (ii) public distribution of the 
procured output. 
To some extent, the procurement policy helped to bring about the production gains 
described above, by reducing the price risks faced by farmers and assuring them positive 
returns from using modern technology. At the same time, the public distribution program 
helped to ease the strains of poverty by keeping low the food prices faced by low income 
consumers. Thus, Indian food policy has generated benefits for both producers and 
consumers. 
On the other hand, several problems in the policy apparatus have been pointed out, such as 
the excessive geographical concentration of procurement activities, the setting of 
unreasonable procurement prices, and inefficiency in the distribution of grains (Chand 2005; 
Ramaswami 2002). 
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Figure 2-3  Decomposition of Rice Consumption Growth
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Source: Consumption from United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Foreign Agricultural Service, 
Production, Supply and Distribution Online (http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/); population from World 
Bank, World Development Indicators Online.
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Government Procurement and the Minimum Support Price 
There are two channels by which rice is procured by the government. The first channel is 
direct purchasing of paddy from farmers. This involves farmers – or traders who purchase 
grain from producers at the farm gate – carrying paddy to organized wholesale markets 
(called mandis) or to procurement centers. In principle, the Food Corporation of India (FCI) 
and the procurement arms of state governments are prepared to buy the entire amount at the 
minimum support price (MSP), as long as the grain satisfies a minimum standard called “fair 
average quality (FAQ)”. 
The MSP is set by the government each year based on recommendations by the 
Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP). It is set largely on a cost-plus basis, 
using cost-of-cultivation estimates obtained through farm surveys. The rationale for fixing the 
MSP is to provide farmers sufficient production incentives, and to reduce the price risks faced 
by them. The MSP is also a key policy lever that controls the amount of grain that the 
government procures. In principle, the MSP for paddy is supposed to be announced before 
planting in the rainy (kharif) season begins. In reality, however, the MSP announcement 
rarely takes place before the planting period, which begins as early as May in some states. 
In the northern states of Punjab and Haryana, paddy is procured at mandis by FCI agents 
who attend the competitive auctions held there. If a consignment of paddy fails to be 
purchased by a private-sector buyer at a price above the MSP, and if it satisfies the FAQ 
standard, the FCI agent steps in to buy it (Meenakshi and Banerji 2005). In regions where 
organized wholesale markets are underdeveloped, the FCI and the state procurement agencies 
buy paddy at their own procurement centers. 
Whenever a farmer expects his grain to receive a market price above the MSP – due to 
favorable market conditions or superior grain quality – he can sell it to a private buyer rather 
than to the procurement agency. Thus, direct procurement of paddy does not intervene in the 
voluntary behavior of farmers and traders. Nevertheless, the MSP and the wholesale market 
price are strongly interdependent. On the one hand, private-sector buyers must offer 
wholesale prices above the MSP in order to fulfill their needs. On the other hand, the 
government must take the wholesale market price into account when setting the MSP, or it 
will end up procuring too much or too little grain. This interdependence will figure 
prominently in subsequent discussions. 
The second procurement channel involves millers selling a fixed percentage of their output 
to the state government at a statutory price. Called the rice levy, this system is based on 
mandatory provision of rice by millers.5 The statutory price, called the levy price, is 
calculated by adding milling costs and a modest margin to the MSP. The government’s hope 
is that rice millers will behave competitively in the wholesale market and bid the price of 
paddy up to the MSP.  In reality, however, farmers often sell paddy to millers at prices 
substantially below the MSP (see, for example, Kurmanath 2009). The share of levied rice in 
total government procurement was around 60 percent during the 1990s, but has remained 
below 40 percent since 2005-06.6 
                                                  
5 The levy percentage varies across states. In the six largest rice procurement states (jointly contributing nearly 
90 percent of the total procured amount), millers provide between 50 and 75 percent of their output to the state 
governments. Basmati and other specialty varieties are exempted from the levy. 
6 The share of levied rice was calculated from data available on the FCI’s website, assuming a milling ratio of 70 
percent. 
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Geographical Distribution of Procurement 
Figure 2-4 presents the volume of rice procurement by the government along with its ratio to 
total production. Both paddy directly procured from farmers and rice levied from millers are 
included. From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, government procurement as a proportion of 
production remained in the 10 to 15 percent range. The share then started to rise in the late 
1990s, reaching 30 percent by the 2007-2008 marketing year (October to September). 
As the state-wise breakdown shows, the largest amount of rice is contributed by Punjab. In 
the early 1980s, around 45 percent of the government-procured rice originated there, but by 
the mid-2000s, Punjab’s share had fallen to around 30 percent. The share of neighboring 
Haryana is also falling in recent years, indicating that the dominance of the northern granary 
is gradually weakening. 
Meanwhile, rice procurement from Andhra Pradesh has grown steadily over the last three 
decades. In 2007-2008, it came close to overtaking Punjab as the largest contributor of rice to 
the government. Chhattisgarh and Orissa are also notable for large procurements in recent 
years. These two states barely saw any rice procurement before the early 1990s, but their 
contributions have grown under the Decentralized Procurement Scheme that began in the late 
1990s. This scheme allows each state to procure its PDS requirements from within its borders. 
As a result, we are seeing a gradual geographical diversification of rice procurement. 
Table 2-3 presents state-level information on the size of the marketable surplus of rice in 
the late 1990s, as surveyed by the Directorate of Marketing and Inspection.7 It reveals that 
Punjab is an exception among the main rice producing states: less than 3 percent of its rice 
output is consumed in-state, and well over 90 percent of the paddy is considered as 
marketable surplus. More than 50 percent of the marketable surplus in Punjab is sold by 
farmers directly to the FCI, while in the other major states excluding Tamil Nadu, the FCI’s 
share is less than 1 percent. 
 
 
                                                  
7 The estimates from the Directorate’s Marketable Surplus and Post Harvest Losses Survey (Directorate of 
Marketing and Inspection 2002) are slightly outdated. However, they are likely to be more reliable than 
estimates based on the Cost of Cultivation surveys, found in such publications as Department of Agriculture 
and Cooperation (2008). Unfortunately, the Marketable Surplus survey is conducted irregularly at long 
intervals, and the last available data is from the late 1990s. 
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The two eastern states of Bihar and Orissa have a “rice deficit” in that household 
consumption of rice in those states exceeds production. The marketable surplus ratio is low in 
these states: more than 60 percent of the paddy output is consumed by the producing 
households. Of the output that is traded, a fairly large proportion – 8.3 percent in Bihar and 
13.6 percent in Orissa – is sold directly to consumers. Presumably, this consists mainly of 
intra-village sales. Nevertheless, in both states more than 80 percent of the marketable surplus 
is sold to traders, which implies that farmers sell approximately 30 percent of their output to 
traders. Thus, even in the rice-deficit states, the degree of commercialization is substantial. 
In Orissa’s case, a non-negligible amount is sold directly to the FCI, and a larger amount is 
procured by the state government. During the period from 1996-1997 to 1998-1999, 
approximately 18 percent of the marketable surplus rice in the state was procured by the 
government. This shows that even in a rice-deficit state with a low marketable surplus ratio, 
the government can conduct significant procurement operations. 
By implication, it should be possible to expand procurement operations in hitherto 
neglected regions like Bihar. In recent years, serious political efforts have been made to 
increase paddy procurement in Bihar. However, purchases by the FCI and other agencies 
remain below two hundred thousand tons, or less than 3 percent of the state’s output (The 
Bihar Times 2009; The Hindu 2009). The main obstacle appears to be the lack of sufficient 
marketing infrastructure, especially storage facilities (The Bihar Times 2010). 
 
Co-movement of Wholesale Prices and the MSP 
To see the effect of government procurement on the rice market, we look at the co-movement 
of the MSP and the wholesale market price for paddy in Figure 2-5. The wholesale price data 
are taken from two mandis in North India: one in Amritsar, Punjab and the other in Bahraich, 
Uttar Pradesh. The distance from Amritsar to Delhi is approximately 400 kilometers as the 
crow flies, while Bahraich is roughly 450 kilometers from Delhi.8 The data represent average 
wholesale prices during the harvest season for common long grain varieties such as IR8 and 
PR106, similar to what the government procures in North India. 
A notable feature of Figure 2-5 is that the average market price in Amritsar is always 
higher than the MSP. This reflects the fact that government procurement is well-established in 
Punjab state. That most of the procurement in Punjab takes the form of direct paddy purchases, 
rather than rice levies, also explains why the MSP functions as a floor price in Amritsar 
(Damodaran 2000). 
By contrast, paddy and rice procurement is not consistent in eastern Uttar Pradesh, where 
Bahraich is located (Chand 2005). For this reason, there are many years, such as 2000-2001, 
2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008, when the average market price is 
significantly below the MSP. 
 
 
 
                                                  
8 Amritsar and Bahraich were chosen because price data going back to the 1970s were available for these two 
markets. Nevertheless, data for Amritsar after 2002-2003 was not available. Therefore, the figures for 
“Amritsar” from 2003-2004 onward are from the mandi in Ajnala, a town 30 kilometers away (both towns are 
in Amritsar district). During the 2005 harvest season, daily paddy arrivals in Ajnala and Bahraich averaged 
around 1,850 tons and 940 tons, respectively. Measured in these terms, both mandis are of average size in their 
respective regions. 
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Pressures of Export Demand 
Figure 2-5 also provides insight into the relationship between the domestic and international 
markets. The uppermost graph is the export price of Thai rice, converted into constant rupee 
terms, which serves as an indicator of supply and demand conditions in the international 
market. During periods when the Thai export price stayed high – such as the mid-1990s and 
the mid-2000s – the market price in Amritsar rose, departing significantly from the MSP. This 
strongly suggests that the demand for exported rice reached Amritsar and its surrounding 
areas. 
This is not surprising, because Punjab appears to have been a source of non-basmati rice 
export since it was liberalized in the mid-1990s. Punjab and Haryana have traditionally been 
centers of basmati exports, and for this reason, many of the private-sector miller-traders who 
had any experience in exporting rice prior to liberalization were located in these two states or 
in Delhi. After the liberalization of non-basmati exports, these miller-exporters emerged as 
the main players in this new business.9 It is likely that they procured much of the exported 
rice from the Punjab-Haryana region, thereby contributing to the rise in wholesale prices 
there. 
In some periods, the demand for rice from overseas is so high, and the pressure on domestic 
wholesale prices so strong, that the MSP has to be revised upward in order for the government 
to fulfill its procurement target. As described in section 4, this was the case in 2007. Thus, in 
markets such as Amritsar, both the wholesale price and the MSP are strongly dependent on 
conditions in the international market. 
Meanwhile, Figure 2-5 shows that average market prices in Bahraich have remained at or 
below the MSP even during periods of high international prices. Unlike Punjab, Haryana, and 
western Uttar Pradesh, Bahraich and its surroundings in eastern Uttar Pradesh are less 
developed in terms of marketing infrastructure. The processing and trading industries are also 
less developed there (Singh and Ram 1993). For these reasons, it is likely that conditions in 
the international market have had a weaker influence on market prices in Bahraich. 
 
                                                  
9 The Ministry of Agriculture’s Directorate of Rice Development maintains a list of the main exporters of 
non-basmati rice as of February 2003. Of the 51 miller-exporters listed, 38 also appear on the list of main 
basmati exporters (see http://dacnet.nic.in/rice/Rice%20Export.htm). 
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Downward Rigidity of the MSP 
A notable feature of the MSP for paddy is its extreme downward rigidity. As can be seen from 
Figure 2-6, the MSP has never fallen in nominal terms. To some extent, this is understandable 
because the determination of the MSP includes a cost-plus component, and agricultural input 
costs have seldom fallen in India. The active political lobbying of rice farmers is another 
contributing factor. 
Given the Indian rice sector’s exposure to the international market since the mid-1990s, 
however, it is becoming difficult to justify the unidirectional movement of the MSP. For one 
thing, international prices are anything but unidirectional; if the MSP is not allowed to fall, 
there will be occasional periods, such as the late 1990s and early 2000s, when it becomes too 
high relative to prevailing market conditions. Secondly, the MSP is moving away from the 
cost-plus formula, and becoming more strongly influenced by demand in both domestic and 
international markets. 
Analysts such as Chand (2005) have called for the MSP to be linked to demand conditions 
in a more reasonable manner. So far, the toughest move by the government has been to freeze 
the MSP for paddy in 2003-2004. 
 
Structure of Public Distribution 
Most of the government-procured rice is distributed to domestic consumers through the public 
distribution system (PDS) and other social welfare programs. The main aim of the PDS is to 
alleviate malnutrition by raising the food consumption of low-income households. Food items 
including rice, wheat, and sugar, as well as non-food items such as kerosene, are sold through 
fair price shops located throughout the country. 
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Figure 2-6  MSP for Paddy in Nominal Terms
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, various issues.
Note: The values include mid-year bonuses.
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Under the PDS, the rice and wheat procured by the FCI and state agencies are sold to state 
governments at an administered price called the central issue price (CIP). The regulated price 
of grain at fair price shops is fixed by each state government, taking into consideration the 
costs of intra-state distribution. The price of rice charged at fair price shops is lower than the 
government’s cost of procurement, which is calculated as the sum of the MSP and the per-unit 
costs of storage, transport, etc. Thus, the government loses money on every kilogram of rice 
that it sells through the PDS. The aggregated value of this loss is called the “food subsidy”. 
Since April 2002, the maximum amount of PDS grain that a below-poverty-line (BPL) family 
can buy at a fair price shop has been fixed at 35 kilograms per month (Department of Food 
and Public Distribution 2010). 
Figure 2-7 shows the PDS prices for rice. Up to November 1997, a single CIP was set for 
all PDS sales. Since December 1997, two separate CIPs have been set: a low price for BPL 
households, and a higher one for above-poverty-line (APL) households. State governments 
can purchase grains at the lower CIP up to a quota defined by the estimated number of BPL 
households in their respective areas. Each state is then responsible for identifying which 
households are actually below the poverty line, and issuing ration cards to those households. 
Since July 2000, the CIP for BPL households has been fixed at 5.65 rupees per kilogram 
(US$0.12), which is substantially below the government’s procurement cost. The estimated 
number of BPL households is 65.2 million (based on 2000 population estimates), and the 
maximum quantity of grain (the sum of rice and wheat) allocated to them is 27.4 million tons 
per year. 
In December 2000, an even lower price for the poorest of the BPL households was 
introduced, under a program called Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY). Unlike the BPL and APL 
prices, the AAY price is defined at the retail level. Households with AAY ration cards are 
able to buy grain at the highly subsidized price of three rupees per kilogram. The government 
estimates that 25 million households (38.3 percent of all BPL households) should be eligible 
for the AAY benefits (Department of Food and Public Distribution 2010). 
Figure 2-7 compares the PDS prices to the retail price in the open market in Delhi. It shows 
that the gap between the market price and the PDS prices has been expanding rapidly since 
the mid-2000s. PDS prices have clearly not been adjusted to market conditions. 
Partly as a result of this widening gap, the quantity of rice supplied through the PDS has 
been growing rapidly in recent years (Figure 2-8). In 2006-2007, the quantity of rice 
distributed through the PDS reached 21.2 million tons, comprising 24.5 percent of total 
consumption. Another reason behind this growth is that the government has been adjusting 
the rice-to-wheat ratio of PDS grains in favor of rice. 
The expansion of other social welfare programs also contributed to the increase in 
government distribution of rice up to the mid-2000s. A mid-day meal program for 
government schools consumes approximately 1.3 million tons of rice per year. The 
food-for-work program, where laborers’ wages at public works sites are paid in kind with 
grain, was another large consumer of government-distributed rice. Since the enactment of the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in 2005, however, wages for public works are 
more often paid in cash. This explains why, in Figure 2-8, the amount of rice distributed 
through “other social welfare programs” has been declining since the mid-2000s. 
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Source: Ministry of Finance. Economic Survey, various issues; Department of Food and Public 
Distribution (2008).
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Criticism of the PDS 
The PDS has been criticized for its inefficiency and for the corruption that surrounds its 
administration in some parts of the country. It is reported that a large amount of grain is 
diverted from the system, in the process generating illicit profits for various middlemen and 
officials including the managers of fair price shops (Mooij 2001; Yardley 2010). As a result, 
in many regions including Bihar, a large proportion of PDS grains fails to reach the targeted 
low-income households at the subsidized prices. 
Despite these problems, the PDS continues to be a pillar of India’s poverty reduction policy. 
One reason is the strength of vested interests, including the farmers who gain from having a 
large part of their output procured by the government. Another reason is that in some parts of 
the country, such as the southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and 
Karnataka, the PDS works reasonably well at distributing food to the targeted households 
(Mooij 1999a; 1999b; Ramaswami 2002). Thus, politicians in those states rely on the 
continued existence of the PDS, as well as its expansion, to gain and maintain popular 
support. 
The rise in government distribution of rice may be one of the reasons for the rebound in per 
capita rice consumption during the mid-2000s, as shown in Figure 2-3. In states where the 
PDS and other social welfare programs are functional, the large-scale targeting of food 
subsidies to the lowest-income households is likely to have had the desired effect, albeit at a 
high fiscal cost. It is probable that this experience strengthened, in the minds of politicians 
and possibly the electorate, the indispensability of the PDS. 
 
Management of Stocks 
While there is a direct link between the government procurement of rice and its distribution 
through the PDS, there is a gap in timing between the two activities. This implies that the 
public food system carries a large stock of rice at any given time. The Indian government 
fixes buffer stock norms for the beginning of each quarter of the year, by taking into 
consideration the expected distributional requirements and procurement volumes for each 
season.10 
Figure 2-9 presents these buffer stock norms along with the actual size of the central 
government’s stocks. The period between mid-2000 and mid-2003 is characterized by a 
buffer stock that is far above the norm, which was caused by excess procurement of rice that 
began in the late 1990s. During this period, the MSP was set above the market-clearing level. 
The international price of rice was low, and there was little scope for commercial export of 
non-basmati rice. This resulted in the build-up of government stocks (Chand 2005). 
Increasing the distribution of rice through the PDS and other welfare schemes helped to 
draw down this excess stock. Before the Indian government got around to these distributional 
measures, however, much rice was also released into the international market. 
 
                                                  
10 The government also specifies the size of a food security reserve, which is not included in the buffer norms. 
As of August 2010, the food security reserve consists of two million tons of rice and three million tons of 
wheat (Department of Food and Public Distribution 2010). 
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3. Rice Exports Prior to 2007 
 
Indian rice exports are divided into two distinct groups: basmati and non-basmati. Basmati 
rice has long been a major export crop. As seen from Figure 2-10, the volume of basmati 
exports has grown steadily over the years, and has stayed above one million tons per year 
since 2004-2005. The main destination of basmati exports is the Middle East, with Saudi 
Arabia being the largest importer. 
By comparison, the volume of non-basmati rice exports has been volatile. Up to the early 
1990s, quantitative restrictions kept the annual volume of non-basmati exports well below 
one million tons. In 1993, as part of a wide-ranging export liberalization policy, the 
quantitative restrictions on non-basmati rice exports were replaced by a minimum export 
price (Ministry of Finance 1994). The minimum export price was then abolished in 1994 
(Ministry of Finance 1995). In 1995-1996, the first full year after complete liberalization, a 
record-breaking 4.54 million tons of non-basmati rice was exported. The following year’s 
exports were less than half this amount, but there was another surge in 1998-1999 when more 
than 4 million tons was exported. 
During 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, non-basmati exports slumped as international prices 
sagged (compare Figures 2-5 and 2-10). The government failed to lower the MSP in response 
to market conditions, which caused it to procure large amounts of rice, building up massive 
stocks as shown in Figure 2-9. Then, in 2001 the government began to unload its excess 
stocks onto the international market. This is reflected in the rise of non-basmati exports from 
2001-2002 onward. 
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The export of government rice was not directly carried out by the government. 
Private-sector exporters bought the rice from the FCI at the fixed rate of 5,650 rupees per ton, 
which was equal to the subsidized PDS price for BPL households at the time. This price was 
significantly lower than the export prices from Thailand and Vietnam, even after taking 
exporters’ margins into account (Damodaran 2001). Combined with the existence of entry 
barriers, both artificial and natural, this ensured that exporters with access to the FCI’s 
supplies made substantial profits.11 In 2002-2003 alone, a staggering 8.1 million tons was 
released by the government for export (Department of Food and Public Distribution 2005). 
Such actions by the Indian government played a role in the prolonged stagnation of 
international prices (see Figure 2-5). 
Once the distribution of rice through the PDS and other social welfare programs started to 
pick up, and buffer stocks approached their normal levels, it became unnecessary for the 
government to dump its stock onto the international market. Thus, large-scale exports of 
government rice have not occurred since October 2004, with the exception of rice exported as 
food aid (Department of Food and Public Distribution 2010). 
 
                                                  
11 The buyers of FCI rice were limited to large companies with a certain level of exporting experience, and this 
created an artificial entry barrier against smaller traders (Padmanabhan 2002). In addition, seaborne trade in 
non-basmati rice generally takes place through bulk cargo ships with loads greater than ten thousand tons. 
This creates a technological entry barrier. Reflecting these barriers to entry, Damodaran (2001) notes that 
many of the traders who exported FCI rice during this period were the large miller-exporters located in Delhi. 
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Source: Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, various issues.
Notes: The figures for 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 are provisional.
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Meanwhile, a resurgence in private-sector exports of non-basmati rice occurred in the 
mid-2000s, as conditions in the international market improved. More than three million tons 
of non-basmati rice was exported in each of the years between 2004-2005 and 2007-2008. 
When combined with basmati exports, average export volume surpassed 4 million tons per 
year, making India the third largest rice exporter in the world after Thailand and Vietnam. 
 
 
4. The Export Restrictions of 2007-2008 
 
India’s reign as a top rice exporter turned out to be short-lived. During the price surge of 
2007-2008, it was forced to halt the export of non-basmati rice. This section provides an 
account of the major developments during this period, and the government’s actions are 
evaluated in the subsequent section. 
 
The Need for Rice Procurement 
As mentioned in Section 2, the political importance of food distributed through the PDS and 
other social welfare schemes is likely to have grown in recent years. When the United 
Progressive Alliance, led by the Congress Party, took power in the 2004 general elections, it 
was seen as a victory for the relatively pro-poor stance of the alliance members. Thus, it was 
natural for the new government to place renewed importance on social welfare programs such 
as the PDS. 
Meanwhile, conditions in the domestic rice market appeared favorable to the government’s 
procurement operations until 2006. Rice procurement in 2005-2006 reached a historical high 
of 27.7 million tons, and domestic supplies remained abundant during 2006-2007. However, 
when the government announced in July 2006 that the MSP for paddy would be set at 5,800 
rupees (US$126) per ton, the state leadership of Punjab immediately called for it to be raised, 
claiming rising cultivation costs (The Tribune 2006). The central government quickly 
responded and raised the MSP by 400 rupees in August, which eventually generated a 
comfortable procurement of 25.1 million tons for 2006-2007. 
The politicians’ aggressive calls for a higher MSP, and the government’s quickness to 
concede, can be traced to developments in the wheat market. In early 2006, the government 
failed to meet its wheat procurement targets despite a mid-season raise in the MSP from 6,500 
rupees to 7,000 rupees per ton. The procured amount of 9.2 million tons was a 38 percent 
reduction from the previous year. As a result, the government had to import 4.4 million tons 
of wheat, an amount not seen since the 1960s (Department of Food and Public Distribution 
2007). Domestic procurement of wheat fell short of the target again in 2007. This 
strengthened the government’s resolve to meet the procurement target for rice at any cost. 
 
Responding to an Unprecedented Export Demand 
2007 was an exceptional year for the international rice market, even before the price surge 
late in the year. Between April and September, non-basmati rice exports from India were 48.2 
percent greater than in the same period of the previous year. In August, it was reported that in 
the southern state of Andhra Pradesh, some rice millers were exporting rice without meeting 
the state’s levy requirements (Sarma 2007). North Indian mandis were also experiencing a 
rise in wholesale prices due to high export demand. 
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The MSP for rice announced in May was 6,450 rupees (US$157) per ton – only 4 percent 
above the previous year’s rate. At this level, the government’s procurement operations that 
began in September were doomed to fail; by October, wholesale market prices for common 
rice in Amritsar were as high as 10,000 rupees (US$250) per ton. 
As Damodaran (2007a) observes, domestic prices may have surged precisely because the 
MSP was considered to be unacceptably low. Many farmers and traders, expecting a large 
upward revision of the MSP in the near future, refrained from putting their supplies on the 
wholesale market. The shortage created by this strategic behavior is likely to have fuelled the 
price rise. 
 
Imposing and Adjusting Export Restrictions 
Faced with the possibility of a procurement failure, the government announced a ban on 
non-basmati rice exports on October 9, 2007. Simultaneously, the MSP was raised to 6,950 
rupees. The export ban was met with strong opposition by exporters, especially in South India 
where premium rice varieties grown for export do not belong to the basmati category. There 
was also much confusion as to whether shipments ordered before the ban could be carried 
through. 
In response, on October 31 the government lifted the ban and imposed a minimum export 
price (MEP) instead. The initial MEP for non-basmati rice was US$425 per ton. The aim was 
to stop the cheaper varieties from being exported so that the government procurement targets 
could be met; no international buyers were expected to pay more than US$425 for common 
rice. 
To the government’s surprise, with the global price rise accelerating in November, 
non-basmati rice – including common varieties such as PR106 – began to be exported in large 
quantities at prices above the MEP (Damodaran 2008). It was also reported that some 
exporters were over-invoicing their shipments in order to clear the MEP threshold (The 
Economic Times 2007). In this way, the export of non-basmati rice continued unabated after 
the imposition of the MEP, and domestic wholesale market prices continued to rise as a result 
(Damodaran 2007b). 
The government’s response was to raise the MSP to 7,450 rupees in November, but to no 
avail. It then raised the MEP to US$500 per ton in December, but this was still not enough to 
stem the flow of non-basmati exports, so the MEP was raised to US$650 in early March 2008, 
and then finally to US$1,000 later that month. A separate MEP for basmati rice was 
introduced in early March at US$900 per ton. This was revised in late March to US$1,100. 
As the central government struggled to find the correct MEP level, some state governments 
began imposing their own quantitative restrictions on rice exports. From the end of 2007 to 
the beginning of 2008, the government of Andhra Pradesh prohibited rice millers from selling 
to exporters. In Chhattisgarh, rice millers had to present proof to state officials that they 
fulfilled the rice levy before being allowed to export (Damodaran 2007b). Emulating these 
measures, the Indian government prohibited the export of non-basmati rice on April 1, 2008, 
and raised the MEP for basmati varieties to US$1,200. 
In hindsight, the Indian government’s piecemeal approach to using MEPs may have fuelled 
the global price surge. Each raise in the MEP failed to halt the tide of non-basmati exports. 
This generated expectations among traders and speculators that the government would take 
more restrictive measures in future, and that those measures would cause prices to rise. These 
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expectations may have kept international prices afloat, which, in turn, caused the successive 
hikes in MEP to fail to stem exports. By the time the non-basmati MEP reached US$1,000, 
international prices may have been kept afloat only by the vague notion that even more 
restrictive measures, implying even higher prices, were in store. 
 
Domestic Market Developments after the Ban 
After India banned non-basmati exports, the price surge in international markets continued for 
a few more weeks. The Chicago Board of Trade rough rice futures contract peaked at the end 
of April 2008, and the monthly average export price of Thai rice reached its peak in May 
(USDA 2010). The subsequent fall in international prices indicates that fears of future 
shortages had subsided, even though India’s non-basmati export supply had officially shut 
down. 
Meanwhile, the Indian government’s MSP of 7,450 rupees per ton represented a 20 percent 
increase from the previous year. This was a relatively modest increase, given that the 
international price of rice stayed at approximately twice the pre-crisis level even after it 
stabilized. In the now-closed rice economy of India, however, the MSP appeared attractive to 
farmers, and the government ended up procuring a record-breaking 28.5 million tons. Figure 
2-4 reveals that a particularly large quantity was procured in Andhra Pradesh. Early efforts by 
the Andhra Pradesh government to curb exports and increase procurement were apparently 
successful. 
The MSP for 2008-2009 was further raised to 9,000 rupees per ton. This raise had less to 
do with any increases in cultivation cost, and more to do with appeasing farmers deprived of 
profitable exporting opportunities. It is not surprising that the resulting rice procurement was 
another record-breaking one: a staggering 33.7 million tons. Having made exceptionally large 
procurements for two consecutive years, the government’s rice stocks grew uncontrollably; by 
mid-2009, it was more than twice as large as the buffer norm (Department of Food and Public 
Distribution 2010; see figure 2-9). 
To outside observers, it appeared that the Indian government was repeating the mistake it 
made in the late 1990s: setting the MSP too high and amassing unmanageably large stocks. 
The drought of 2009, however, brought some vindication to the government. Rice production 
during 2009-2010 was 89.1 million tons, approximately 10 percent less than the previous year. 
Responding to the inflationary pressures created by this shortfall, between October 2009 and 
March 2010 the government allocated three million tons of rice to the Open Market Sales 
Scheme. Under this scheme, state governments were expected to purchase rice from the FCI 
at prices of around 15,000 rupees per ton, and supply it directly to consumers through fair 
price shops and other channels (Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution 
2010; Vydhianathan and Radhakrishnan 2010). 
Unfortunately, these efforts have apparently been insufficient for bringing government 
stocks under control. There was a national uproar in July 2010 when newspapers reported that 
large amounts of rice and wheat were rotting in the FCI’s storage facilities, where the grain 
had been kept under near-open conditions (Halarnkar and Randhawa 2010; Deccan Herald 
2010). 
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Exceptions to the Export Ban 
As of August 2010, the ban on non-basmati rice exports remains in effect. This has especially 
disappointed farmers and exporters in South India, where high-priced non-basmati varieties 
are grown. Even though a premium non-basmati variety from North India called Pusa-1121 
was allowed to be exported in September 2008, none of its southern counterparts have 
received the same favorable treatment. This has led some South Indian exporters to accuse the 
central government of having a “northern bias” (The Economic Times 2010). 
Meanwhile, some non-basmati rice has been exported from India in the form of food aid to 
other developing countries. Between October 2007 and June 2009, the Indian government 
approved 35 government-to-government deals concerning rice exports.12 The largest by far 
was the agreement announced in February 2008 to sell 450 thousand tons to Bangladesh, 
which had been ravaged by a cyclone and floods the previous year. The actual transaction was 
carried out not by the Indian government, but by private-sector exporters under contract with 
state trading enterprises (Sarma 2009). The Bangladesh government paid around US$400 a 
ton, near the prevailing international price (Kabir 2008). Similarly, 
government-to-government trades with African countries were humanitarian in principle, but 
somewhat commercial in practice. 
Some rent-seeking problems have been reported in relation to these food aid transactions, 
where certain Indian exporters were accused of colluding with officials of foreign 
governments in requesting the Indian government to lift the non-basmati export ban on a 
case-by-case basis (Datta 2009). The ban has created a large gap between the domestic price 
of rice in India and that in other countries, and this has presented significant profit 
opportunities. If, for instance, an exporter can procure rice in the open market in India and 
then sells it in an African country at the local price, he stands to make a substantial profit. In 
any country where a vibrant business community exists, such opportunities will inevitably 
give rise to rent-seeking activities. 
A similar situation exists in Japan, where the domestic price of rice is several times higher 
than the international price due to tariff protection. When combined with Japan’s WTO 
obligations to import a minimum of 767 thousand tons of rice each year, this arbitrage 
opportunity becomes a rent-seeking threat. The Japanese government’s response to this 
situation may be of interest to Indian policy makers. 
Rather than importing the entire “minimum access” quantity by itself, or assigning a 
specific firm to do it, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) 
holds regular auctions, called simultaneous buy and sell (SBS) auctions, in which 
private-sector companies participate.13 The companies form buyer-seller pairs; usually, the 
buyer is a Japanese wholesaler and the seller is a foreign miller-exporter or a Japanese trading 
company. Each pair submits a bid to the government auctioneer, where a bid consists of a 
buying price as well as a selling price. The auctioneer then awards the importing contracts to 
                                                  
12 Not all of these deals have been carried out. For example, in October 2008 a total of 55,000 tons of 
non-basmati rice was cleared for export to Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, and Cameroon. By June 2009, the only 
transaction to actually have taken place was the 15,000-ton deal with Ghana (Srinivas 2009). 
13 The SBS auction is used for private sector imports of rice meant for domestic retail consumption. This 
comprises approximately 100 thousand tons, or thirteen percent of the minimum access quota. The remainder 
is imported by the government and sold in the domestic market for processing and feed purposes, or 
re-exported as food aid. Fukuda et al. (2003) contains a description of the Japanese rice import system, 
including the SBS scheme. 
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the buyer-seller pairs whose margins (the difference between the buying and selling prices) 
are the highest. The winners then pay a fee to the government that is calculated on the basis of 
their bid margins. In this way, the Japanese government extracts a large proportion of the 
profits that arise from minimum access imports. Not only is the scope for rent-seeking 
reduced by this system, the government also gains substantial revenues. 
 
 
5. Evaluating the Government’s Actions 
 
Necessity of Export Restrictions 
The previous section’s description of the events in 2007-2008 supports the notion that the 
Indian government’s export restrictions, as well as its piecemeal manner of implementation, 
contributed to the international surge in rice prices. As described in Chapter 1, the price surge 
had a large negative impact, both economically and socially, on rice-importing developing 
countries. This has led some foreign governments and international organizations to criticize 
India’s conduct during the crisis, along with that of other countries restricting agricultural 
exports. For instance, in June 2008 the president of the World Bank spoke of the need for “an 
international call to remove export bans and restrictions” (Zoellick 2008). 
Such calls are, however, unlikely to be heeded given the lack of meaningful discipline 
against export restrictions (Mitra and Josling 2009). Unless governments find it in their own 
interest, or that of their citizens, export bans and other restrictions are unlikely to go away. 
The relevant question, then, is whether the imposition of export restrictions on rice was the 
best policy option for India. 
To answer this question, one needs to clarify the objectives of the Indian government. First, 
increasing the food consumption of the lowest income households has been given high 
priority by the government. This was made explicit in the Prime Minister’s 2010 
Independence Day speech, in which he states that the government “wants a food safety net in 
which no citizen of ours would go hungry” (Singh 2010). Second, government leaders have 
been concerned about the level of food prices faced by consumers. In the same speech, the 
Prime Minister emphasizes that the government is “making every possible effort to tackle” 
the inflation in food prices, and endeavoring “to minimize the burden of increased prices on 
the poor” (Singh 2010). As the latter quote implies, India’s “food safety net”, consisting 
mainly of the Public Distribution System, is not sufficient to meet the needs of the poor; 
low-income households must obtain some proportion of their food – the majority, in many 
cases – from the open market. 
What viable policy alternatives, besides restricting exports, did the government have in 
pursuing these objectives in 2007-2008? Apparently not many, because the Indian 
government’s only policy lever, besides border measures, was the level of MSP. Raising the 
MSP drastically (say, to around 15,000 rupees per ton) instead of stopping at 7,450 rupees 
might have let the government meet its procurement target for 2007-2008. However, a large 
proportion of the procured rice would have failed to reach poor consumers given the rampant 
diversion of grain under the PDS. With no export restrictions and high international market 
prices, grain diversions in 2007-2008 would have been greater than in any previous year, with 
much of the diverted grain being exported. Thus, drastically raising the MSP would have been 
extremely costly to the government – in terms of higher procurement costs not only in 
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2007-2008 but also in subsequent years due to the downward rigidity of the MSP – without 
being effective at securing the food consumption of poor households. Besides, the policy 
would have been totally ineffective at lowering prices in the open market. 
Restricting exports was, by comparison, a more cost-effective measure. And the Indian 
government’s initial policy of trying to control the flow of non-basmati exports, rather than 
banning it altogether, appeared quite reasonable. In essence, the policy consisted of 
bifurcating the domestic rice market into (i) an exporting segment consisting of basmati and 
high-valued non-basmati varieties, and (ii) a domestic segment consisting of common 
varieties whence the government could procure its requirements. This bifurcation was to be 
implemented by setting a MEP for non-basmati rice.14 It was hoped that the government 
could meet its procurement requirement without having to raise the MSP too high, and that 
farmers would continue to have access to export opportunities. 
The strategy failed mainly because the demand for exported rice was stronger than anyone 
had expected. It appeared that no level of MEP was sufficiently high to stem the export of 
common varieties of rice, and thus an outright ban became necessary.15 In hindsight, the 
international price surge might have been less dramatic had India maintained the original 
export ban that it imposed in October 2007. To be fair, though, it is hard to blame the Indian 
government for its piecemeal approach given the high uncertainty and the panicked market 
conditions that prevailed at the time. 
 
Possibilities for Improved Policy Response 
The rice-export restrictions may have been necessary given the government’s objectives and 
constraints in 2007 and the external market conditions that existed. This does not rule out 
improvements in the way that India responds to similar situations in the future. By adjusting 
its food policy, India may be able to reduce its dependence on severe export restrictions such 
as an outright ban. 
One possible avenue is to weaken the competition between the government’s paddy/rice 
procurement operations and the demand from private-sector exporters. In 2007-2008, such 
competition was observed in North Indian mandis where the FCI struggled to buy paddy from 
farmers at the MSP, and in other parts of the country where millers faced the choice between 
exporting rice and fulfilling the rice levy. If this competition can somehow be weakened, the 
need for severe export restrictions will subside. 
A way to achieve this is to widen the geographical coverage of government procurement 
activity. To their credit, the central and state governments have recently succeeded in 
extending rice procurement to Chhattisgarh and Orissa. However, there remain rice-producing 
regions such as Bihar where government procurement is small. In such areas, rice farmers 
receive prices that are below the MSP. In fact, the current food policy makes them worse off, 
                                                  
14 As mentioned by Srinivasan (2008), a specific export tax on non-basmati rice may have been a better tool 
than the MEP for restricting exports. In addition to raising revenue for the government, an export tax drives a 
wedge between the exporter’s sales price and its procurement price, which exerts downward pressure on 
domestic prices. 
15 Some exporters have suggested that the government should have waited to see if the 1,000-dollar MEP set in 
March 2008 would be effective at stemming non-basmati exports before imposing the outright ban (The 
Economic Times 2008). Srinivasan (2008) also mentions that there was a slowdown in rice exports as the MEP 
was raised, which suggests that the policy actually was effective at curbing exports. What level of MEP would 
ultimately have been sufficiently high for achieving the government’s objectives remains an open question. 
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because the inflow of cheap PDS rice from other states exerts downward pressure on the 
wholesale market price. By expanding procurement in such areas, possibly by making use of 
the Decentralized Procurement Scheme, the central and state governments will find that their 
procurement activities compete less severely with export demand. In the newly covered 
regions, the resulting rise in wholesale prices is also likely to elicit a positive supply response 
from farmers. A necessary condition for expanding procurement in areas like Bihar is the 
development of marketing infrastructure such as rural roads, grain storage facilities, and 
regulated market yards. Such investments by themselves are likely to have positive effects on 
farm income and production. 
A second possibility is to reduce the amount of grain handled by the government by 
changing the way it subsidizes the food consumption of low-income households. By doing so, 
the government could focus its grain marketing activities on price stabilization; it would no 
longer need to enter the rice market as a desperate buyer as it did in 2007-2008. As a result, 
market participants will have less of an incentive to speculate on future government actions, 
which will bring some stability to both the domestic and international markets. 
One method for reducing the government’s physical involvement in grain markets is to 
replace the PDS with the food stamps program proposed by Ramaswami (2002). This 
involves targeted distribution to low-income households of vouchers that can be exchanged 
for food grains. Recipients can use the food stamps at regular stores in addition to fair price 
shops, and the distribution of grains is kept entirely within the private sector. The value of 
food stamps is indexed to market grain prices (or, equivalently, denominated in quantity 
terms) so that it is exchangeable with the same amount of grain regardless of market 
conditions. While questions remain about its functionality – namely, whether it will lead to 
higher food grain consumption by the poor – and some economists remain skeptical of its 
benefits (e.g., Swaminathan 2004), the idea appears to be gaining traction in government 
circles (Planning Commission 2002; Ministry of Finance 2010). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Indian citizens in the lowest income group face a real deprivation of food, implying the need 
for policy intervention. For this reason, the large-scale distribution of rice through the public 
distribution system (PDS) and other social welfare schemes has remained a key element of the 
Indian government’s food policy. 
In 2007-2008, the government’s need to procure rice for distribution as well as its desire to 
maintain price stability, combined with an unprecedented demand for Indian rice exports, 
made export restrictions unavoidable. The government’s initial response was a market 
bifurcation strategy, involving the use of a minimum export price (MEP) for non-basmati rice. 
This strategy failed, fuelling an international price surge in the process. In the end, an outright 
ban on non-basmati exports had to be introduced. 
Export restrictions on rice are likely to remain in the Indian government’s policy toolbox as 
long as the provision of food security to its vulnerable citizens remains high on its agenda. 
However, the need for the government to impose severe export restrictions, such an outright 
ban, may be lessened through judicious adjustments of its food policy. 
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